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DOSSIER
From one Libya to Another: The 
Unexpected Place of Law
in Approaching Migration
Delphine Perrin
Abstract:
Migration was one of Qaddafi’s key diplomatic instruments, and for Libyan stakeholders 
today it remains a bargaining chip. While Libya in Qaddafi’s era was considered ‘rogue’ 
and the new Libya is seen as a place without rule, the law has been used to orientate 
migrations, to a greater degree than in other countries of the region. The prolific, 
specific, and ideology-based law Qaddafi developed over twenty years to support Libya’s 
migration diplomacy and policy has been standardised and adapted to global norms since 
the beginning of the 2000s, with a focus on combating irregular migration. Henceforth 
taken only as a transit area, the ‘new Libya’ has accentuated this line and engaged more 
deeply with external partners, intensifying mechanisms to retain migrants upstream of 
the Mediterranean and experimenting platforming migration management in the Sahel.
Keywords: Libya, Migration, Law, Mediterranean, Sahel
Introduction
Libya is now considered a space without faith or law, a hell for migrants trapped there 
on their way to Europe. Today, as in the past, the country’s complex reality, especially 
as regards migration, has been misunderstood outside the country as well as by Libyans 
themselves also caught in mainstream discourses. Strikingly, the harshness of the 
Libyan context has hardly reduced Libya’s attraction as a space for mobility and work 
– it is only the diminishing of opportunities that has. Also strikingly, in a place that has 
long been considered rogue, the law – as norms issued by public authorities – has been 
used to orientate migrations, even more than in other countries of the region.
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During Qaddafi’s era, laws and orders related to migration were mainly messages 
sent to Arab, African, and European states and to the Libyan population – which 
explains the proliferation of legal texts. Since 2011, because of – or in spite of – an 
ineffective government, Libya has become a field of experimentation with new forms 
of migration management, which bring together, on a precarious basis, Libyan and 
external stakeholders around evolving legal norms. Till the beginning of the 2000s, 
the law was used to announce political and diplomatic intentions. As the law has 
become standardised and adapted to global norms, it has lost this dimension in favour 
of focusing on restricting individual rights. While this does not mean that such rights 
were better upheld before, the law that has developed over the last 15 years along a 
standard widely shared worldwide supports and enables restrictions and repression.
For 50 years Libya has been a country with strong labour-based immigration. Thanks to 
and in addition to oil revenues, the political and ideological system defined by Qaddafi 
led to salaried work going to foreign nationals, resulting in a strong labour market for 
the latter. Libya’s attraction for migrants was also fuelled by an emancipatory discourse 
that was seductive for fellow Africans. 
In the 1980s foreign workers were estimated as accounting for more than half of 
the country’s workforce, and virtually all of that of agriculture. This proportion, while 
falling, was still a fifth, or even a quarter, by the fall of Qaddafi in 2011. It was difficult 
to determine the exact number of foreign workers in Libya because of the size of the 
informal economy and the manipulation of statistical data. According to the 2006 
census in Libya, the number of foreign nationals legally residing in the territory was 
estimated at 300,000, 70% of whom were present for work reasons.1 The following 
year, the official estimate was around 700,000,2 in line with that of the United Nations 
Population Division. The number of foreign nationals in an irregular or informal situation 
cannot be verified, but estimates ranged from more than one million to as many as two 
million,3  for a Libyan population of 6 million people. Whatever the exact figure, Libya 
was a regional economic powerhouse because of its abundant and easily accessible 
labour market. It was a major destination for migrants from the neighbourhood, and 
then later coming from further and further afield. 
However, Libya has been seen for the past 15 years as a transit area for migration to 
Europe, a way for the country to be seen as not only an important economic market, 
energy supplier, and bulwark against Islamism but also a border guard essential to 
preventing migrants from heading to Europe, and above all to its nearest points of 
Italy and Malta. The Libyan leader stated time and again after 2004 that his country 
was being overwhelmed by one to two million Africans,4 whose desire to travel to 
Europe was tempered only by Libya’s policy of cooperation. The state of disarray in 
Libya since 2011 has helped revive the European phobia of ‘invasion’ by unwanted 
migrants. Nevertheless, transit migration has also become a more significant reality as 
insecurity and economic breakdown have reduced opportunities in Libya for migrant 
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workers while also fostering – along with the disruption of controls – border crossing 
and the smuggling economy. 
Even if there are no reliable data on the presence of foreign nationals, various current 
estimates approximate the number of migrants at the fall of Qaddafi. According to the 
International Organization for Migration (IOM), 663,000 migrants were identified in 
Libya in December 2018, 93% of which were from African countries. More than half 
are from the neighbouring countries of Egypt, Niger and Chad.5 The fact that these 
are not among the nationalities intercepted in the Mediterranean confirms that their 
presence in Libya is not linked to ambitions of transiting to Europe but rather indicates 
traditional circular migration. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR) also estimates that of the approximately 50,000 refugees and asylum seekers 
currently registered in Libya, 40,000 – the majority from Middle Eastern countries 
– have been living in Libya for many years and are integrated into the community.6 
Other field research (Morone 2016: 247)7 indicates a presence of migrants unrelated 
to the crossing of the Mediterranean. However, the fall of Qaddafi has changed the 
institutional situation and the balance of power and has had an impact on the way in 
which migration occurs. It has also opened up a new field of cooperation and action for 
the European Union (EU) and its ‘strategic partners’ in the Sahel-Saharan region that 
conditions approaches to migration.
The constant violation of migrants’ human rights (detention, collective expulsion, 
inhumane treatment, non-payment of wages) under Qaddafi’s rule has been well 
documented.8 Paradoxically, the law was always in the foreground. Qaddafi ratified a 
large number of international treaties, including most human rights instruments.9 As 
far as migration is concerned, the ‘man of treaties’ ratified in 2004 the International 
Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of 
Their Families, together with the Palermo Protocols supplementing the United Nations 
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.10 National law was also abundant, 
a basic instrument of Qaddafi’s policies, including his migration policies. But while the 
law was an instrument, it was never a basis: the law acted as the posting of policy 
rather than a binding framework. It thus reflected shifts in the Libyan leader’s positions, 
within the country but especially outside, as a part of its diplomacy.
Today’s Libya represents less a break than a continuation and accentuation of the changes 
ongoing since the early 2000s, when post-embargo Libya entered an international 
and regional context of struggle against smuggling and ‘transit migration’. The legal 
framework, or absence thereof, at that time, continued to prevail, and cooperation on 
border and migrant control with the EU and its member states, especially Italy, has even 
intensified. In the new Libya, like in the former one, law is created and used more than 
elsewhere in the region, but it serves to dismiss rights. What is unprecedented is the 
role left to international agencies – the UNHCR and IOM – and the articulation of legal 
and political strategies with Niger in the management of migrants’ profiles, routes, and 
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destinies, transforming a large transnational Sahel-Saharan territory into a platform 
for the selection and distribution of migrants.
Libya in Qaddafi’s era: from a specific and ideology-based law for an immigration 
country to a standardised law for a transit country11
Migration was one of Qaddafi’s diplomatic instruments (Bensaâd 2012, Haddad 2005, 
Perrin 2009), as was law (Perrin 2011). Three major overlapping phases are generally 
identified in Qaddafi’s diplomacy, which appears to correlate with changes in the 
composition of the foreign workforce. From the origins of the Guide’s regime, between 
1969 and 1997, a pan-Arab policy and ideology justified and encouraged the use of 
mainly Arab labour. From 1998, Qaddafi was disappointed by weak Arab support and 
played the African card to obtain the lifting of the international embargo weighing 
on Libya. The ‘African’ workforce was thus solicited and welcome. Finally, after the 
sanctions were lifted in 2003, Tripoli, with a view to strengthening its status and place 
on the international scene, turned to other diplomatic fields, in particular Asian and 
European. At that time, Qaddafi complained of the presence of African12 migrants and 
presented them as migrants in transit to Europe. These three great diplomatic-migratory 
waves – which also have internal (economic, social, and political) bases – have been 
marked by legislative creation.
a) The role of law in supporting migration diplomacy: The national diversification of 
immigrants
In the early 1970s, the foreign presence in Libya was almost 90% Arab, mostly Egyptian 
and Tunisian (Pliez 2004: 140). Along with attempts to unite Libya with its Arab and 
Sahelian neighbours in the 1970s and 1980s,13 Qaddafi developed a network of bilateral 
agreements to guarantee the opening of Libya’s labour market to nationals of those 
countries. Libya, from its convention with Tunisia in 1973 to agreements binding it to 
Algeria and Morocco, claims to guarantee and respect a range of rights for immigrants, 
from the rights of ownership and access to professions to that of transferring wages 
and social benefits to one’s country of origin.
Domestic law was also adapted to guarantee the Libyan pan-Arab policy. A series of 
decisions adopted in the 1980s gave Arab nationals privileges over other foreigners. 
As early as 1980, Law No. 18 defined an ‘Arab nationality’ and strengthened Arab 
citizens’ access to Libyan nationality, already provided for in 1954 by Law No. 17 on 
Libyan nationality. A few years after obtaining this facilitated access to naturalisation, 
Arabs were also granted rights and duties similar to nationals, provided they expressly 
choose Libya as their country of residence. After the adoption of Law No. 6 in 1987 on 
“organising the entry and residence of foreign nationals in Libya”, a series of decisions 
granted Arabs access to professions and the public sector, property, free public services 
(education, care), and even conscription and participation in the army of the people 
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(Decision No. 456 of 1988 on the rights of Arab citizens). To the freedom to enter 
and reside in the Jamahiriya (Law No. 10 of 1989) were added political rights such 
as participation in general popular committees, as well as high administrative and 
political functions (Decision No. 49 of 1990) and priority over other foreign nationals in 
access to work (Decisions No. 602 of 1988 and No. 238 of 1989). 
This pro-Arab communication through law does not exclude the reception of nationals 
of other regions. It was accompanied by an active Sahelian policy, vis-à-vis, for 
example: Niger, with which an agreement was concluded in 1988 to ensure Nigeriens a 
set of rights, but not that of entering the Jamahiriya without a visa; Chad, which Libya 
occupied and annexed until its withdrawal in 1994; and Sudan, with which it signed a 
‘declaration of integration’ in March 1990 for a merger that would never happen.
There were also sub-Saharan Africans in the country. Nevertheless, in that period still 
affected by the Cold War, labour migration often remained local and sub-regional, and 
forced migration was less intense. The Ethiopian/Eritrean, Somali, and Ivorian wars had 
not yet erupted. West Africa still had labour markets, notably Ivorian. From the 1990s, 
new migrations were layered over previous ones, forced for some (due to civil wars in 
East Africa) and de-regionalised for others (due to war in Ivory Coast and economic 
difficulties in the region). 
From 1990, Libya concluded various agreements with its Egyptian neighbour, but the 
decade marked a decline of pan-Arabism and its legal display. In 1991, Decision No. 195 
extended the scope of exceptions to the use of non-Arab labour, already provided for 
in Decision No. 238 of 1989 for medical professions in particular, to other areas such 
as construction. 
At this stage, it is important to emphasise two aspects of Libyan law. First of all, the 
law with an empirical basis, such as a need for medical skills, takes on a legal form 
in order to be used politically; second, the law appears to be discriminatory, with a 
gradation of rights according to national or even ethnic origin, and it is mainly a law of 
exception: rather than being a common law, it enounces categorial rights that appear 
as negotiated (and precarious) privileges.
When Libya swapped pan-Arabism for pan-Africanism because of more explicit support 
from the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) against the embargo, the diplomatic shift 
was obviously introduced into law. The Ministry of Arab Unity disappeared, replaced 
by a Secretary of African Unity, and Qaddafi launched in 1998 the Community of 
Sahel-Saharan States (CENSAD) with the particular objective of freedom of movement 
between its members, the number of which quickly climbed to 28 and now is 24. 
Bilateral agreements were also negotiated with African states. 
Internally, regulations were adapted to official declarations calling for African workers 
and announcing the abolition of entry visas for sub-Saharan ‘brothers’. In 2001, Decision 
No. 403 allowed the African workforce access to the private and public sectors in 
the areas of agriculture, construction, and cleaning services. This temporary, unskilled 
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workforce would theoretically benefit from accommodation and medical expenses 
provided by the employer. References to ‘Africans’ tended to not include Arab migrants 
in the African group rather than stating privileges for Africans, and in parallel Qaddafi 
continued to pursue his Arab policy. The open-door policy for ‘Africans’ did not close 
the door to Arabs, who continued to make up the majority of the foreign population 
and enjoy their privileges. Moreover, even if the call for Africans was emphasised, there 
was actually an opening and a general diversification of the Libyan labour market. Yet, 
even while Libya concluded labour agreements with Jordan in 1998 and Ukraine in 
2004, communication was focused on ‘African’ workers – gradually feeding into the 
idea of a transit Libya.
The year 2004 saw significant legal changes. With the lifting of the international 
embargo, Libya undertook a rapprochement with the EU. Decision No. 1, concerning 
the conditions for using foreign labour, drew an unprecedented distinction between 
nationals of countries with which Libya had concluded bilateral agreements and citizens 
of other countries, who lost priority over the former. This represented a change from a 
(pro-)regional approach to a bilateral policy on a case-by-case basis, though the pursuit 
of diplomatic priorities has remained decisive in the creation and implementation of 
the law. In 2007 it was announced that all foreign nationals would now require an entry 
visa. Even though this did not apply to nationals of Maghreb countries after Tunisia 
reacted strongly, Libyan law appeared to slip towards an indifference to regional 
membership in favour of promoting a more rational approach - a de-ideologisation of 
migration law. From 2004 onwards, the vocabulary used in law returned to that of the 
1970s, that of distinguishing Libyans from foreign nationals. 
National diversification was all the more noticeable as the loss of privileges for Arabs 
did not translate into their departure. Indeed, they remained the majority among the 
immigrant population, joined by ‘Africans’ coming not just from the Sahel but now 
beyond it, due to shrinking labour markets, instability, and violence in West and East 
Africa, and also by Asians and workers of other origins, a new diversity illustrated 
by partnerships concluded in 2010 with China, Ukraine, Iran, Turkey, and Venezuela. 
However, this opening to foreign workers was accompanied by a decline in the rights 
associated with immigration. For instance, Decision No. 98 of 2007, reserved for 
nationals of countries bound to Libya by agreement, excluded foreign nationals from 
free access to public health services and education. 
In its Strategy Paper for Libya 2011–2013, the EU noted a substantial increase in and 
unprecedented flows of irregular migration across Libya since 2007.14 This increase was 
likely due to the legal tightening of migration, as was the case when the EU extended 
its visa requirement at the end of the 1990s. Despite – or because of – an abundant 
law, the situation of foreign nationals in Libya was marked by informality, and then 
reinterpreted as irregularity. 
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b) The role of law in turning informality into irregularity: The statutory diversification 
of immigrants
Immigration in Libya was characterised by a high degree of informality and ease of 
access to the country and to work. The flip side of this was an absence of protection 
of immigrants, who were likely to be arrested, expelled, or imprisoned with similar 
flexibility. It was only in 2006 that employing a foreign national expressly became subject 
to the obligation of regular entry (Decision No. 91). In 2007, having an employment 
contract became a condition for legal employment. That same year, the entry visa 
was reinstated for all nationalities, with the exception of certain Arab nationalities. 
New legal requirements were thus imposed for the acceptance of foreign workers, 
and these requirements were accompanied by checks and arrests apparently aimed at 
enforcing them. These changes did not mean that migration became formalised and 
that the requirements were necessary. Still, the effect of these measures was that they 
enabled and legitimised increased controls and repression. Above all, they supported 
the political message within and outside the country.
As a consequence, Libya converted thousands of migrants in a regular situation, or 
tolerated as such, into irregular migrants denounced as such – a situation that Qaddafi 
was able to exploit very effectively vis-à-vis Libyan public opinion15 and Libya’s new 
European partners. Irregularity mainly affected sub-Saharan Africans who had been 
‘welcome’ without an entry visa since 1998, and saw this formality reinstated from 
2007 onwards. Mainly recruited into the least skilled jobs and the informal economy, 
they represented the most visible part of irregular immigration, which Qaddafi began 
to publicly complain about when it seemed politically advantageous for him to do so. 
The emergence of the term ‘migration’ and the newly created link with illegality are 
meaningful in this regard. This can be seen in Decision No. 10 of 2006, adopted by the 
Supreme Council of Judicial Bodies, which established a court and a prosecutor’s office 
dedicated to violations of Law No. 6 of 1987 and efforts to halt ‘illegal migration’, 
and later in Law No. 19 of 2010 “on combatting illegal migration”. This is in line with 
international rhetoric and a more repressive context already present since Law No. 2 
of 2004 (amending Law No. 6 of 1987), which for the first time drew an association 
between the terms ‘immigrants’ and ‘smuggle’. Actually, foreign nationals’ irregular 
entry, residence, or exit had already been considered felonies under 1987 law, but 
assisting them, as well as engaging in migrant smuggling, were added in 2004 and 
specified in 2010, like in most countries of the region (Perrin 2016). 
In reality, the diplomatic posting of new orientations in Libyan migration policy is often 
merely a camouflage for internal political and economic difficulties. The collective 
expulsions that affected Egyptians, Sudanese, Palestinians, Mauritanians, and other 
nationalities in 1995, apparently acts of retaliation for rapprochement with Israel, 
were above all justified by rising unemployment and discontent among Libyan youth, 
as well as by political instability (Day 2004: 796). The 2007 decisions were part of 
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a context of economic restructuring to reduce public spending and reorganise the 
workforce, especially to promote the employment of Libyans whose unemployment 
rate was constantly increasing. The priority of employment of Libyans, already in place 
since 1989, therefore needed to be bolstered by a policy that affected foreign labour. 
Nevertheless, the ‘Libyanisation’ of employment was relative. A letter from the General 
People’s Congress to the Ministry of Labour in March 2007 limited to a maximum 
of 70% the use of foreign labour in public and private entities. Moreover, the new 
framework retained empirical flexibility. For instance, Decision No. 1 of 2004 imposed 
wage and housing guarantees on employers even before the regularisation of the 
situation of foreign workers; Decision No. 125 of 2005 made having a work visa prior 
to entry a condition of working legally in the country, but provided in the same article 
(art. 43) the possibility of regularising the situation ex post; Decision No. 98 of 2007 
enabled a three-month right of residence for job searching. 
At the time of Qaddafi’s fall, migration-related law was already in the process 
of standardisation in accordance with mainstream trends, for both internal and 
international reasons. Violations of rights, previously a matter of practice, increasingly 
came to be based on law, and continued to vary from one nationality – or colour – to 
another. 
When civil war broke out in 2011, more than 200,000 people fled to Tunisia, with 
similar numbers to Egypt and Niger. Thousands of them were from Mali, Bangladesh, 
and Ghana. Tens of thousands of Tunisians and Chadians also left to return to their 
home country. Among those who were repatriated, UN agencies reported thousands 
of Russians, Chinese, Pakistanis, and Guineans who had worked in Libya for months or 
even years.16 Many Algerians and Moroccans were also repatriated. These facts alone 
highlight the importance and diversity of foreign workers in Libya at that time, even 
while the country was already being depicted as a transit step to Europe.
The ‘New Libya’:17 between legal continuity and managerial innovation for a 
buffer zone
In 2011, hundreds of thousands of foreign nationals left Libya, mainly for neighbouring 
countries. Since then, Libya has been exclusively considered and highlighted as a transit 
zone for migrants wishing to travel to Europe. This has led to denying the reality of 
immigration in Libya. Indeed, hundreds of thousands of foreign nationals have stayed 
in Libya or returned there,18 and this figure has not significantly fallen. 
Thousands of Nigerien citizens live in Libya, where they continue to work as labourers 
on construction sites or as domestic workers. Between 750,000 and 1 million Egyptians 
are estimated to be living in Libya, despite the fact that Egypt has enforced a complete 
travel ban on Libyans since February 2015, when the Islamic State beheaded 21 
Coptic Egyptians.19 While there has also been an undeniable continuity in patterns 
of immigration to Libya (Morone 2016: 247), there is also an accentuation of pre-
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2011 dynamics, such as the national diversification of immigrants. Private companies in 
Libya seek to emancipate themselves from the logic of proximity and from geopolitical 
hazards, which lead them to recruit fewer ‘neighbours’ (Tunisians or Egyptians) and 
more ‘outsiders’ (for instance, Asians in cleaning and computing or Moroccans in 
tourism).20 Nevertheless, Libyan authorities may still link immigration to their foreign 
policy. Between 2012 and 2018, for instance, the Libyan Labour Ministry announced 
several times that Libya was in need of labour from Egypt, a country closely involved in 
the Libyan peace process. Yet, the Egyptian-Libyan mixed commission, like with Tunisia, 
has not resumed meetings, illustrating the lack of framework behind the current 
supposedly legal immigration. Insecurity is also a reason for irregularity, like in the case 
of Moroccan students or workers unable to renew their passports and therefore falling 
into irregularity due to the absence of a Moroccan consulate in Libya.21 
Since the downfall of Qaddafi, law-making and legal institutions have focused exclusively 
on combatting ‘illegal migration’ and on the containment of migrants upstream from 
the Mediterranean and Libya. This is a consequence of the European strategy’s renewal, 
since ‘New Libya’ has resulted in a weaker capacity to control mobility and a search 
for international legitimacy, which has led to increased opportunities for external 
partners to intervene. Two dynamics can therefore be observed: the development of 
mechanisms to make Libya efficient and Europe step back in the Mediterranean; and 
the management of migrants by international agencies, on a ‘platform’ coupling Niger 
and Libya.
a) Intensifying mechanisms to retain migrants: Making Libya efficient in the 
Mediterranean
On the legal side, there is continuity with the pre-existing legal arsenal. As no other law 
has been adopted concerning migration, it is therefore the short Law No. 19 of 2010 on 
combatting illegal immigration that applies, as well as Law No. 6 of 1987, amended by 
Law No. 2 of 2004. The 2010 law defines an “illegal immigrant” (anyone whose entry 
or stay is illegal) and lists the possible penalties for him/her. While Law No. 2 of 2004 
penalises irregular entry, residence, or exit of a foreign national by imposing (undefined) 
detention and/or a fine not exceeding 2,000 LYD, Law No. 19 of 2010 provides for 
(undefined) detention with hard labour or a fine not exceeding 1,000 LYD for the 
“illegal immigrant” (a term for which the definition does not include exit). Law No. 19 
of 2010 above all specifies forbidden smuggling activities and penalties for those who 
help the migrant to enter, stay, exit, or work irregularly – a fine for illegal employment 
– while the 1987 Law provides for the possibility of imprisonment, and detention for 
5 years, 10 years, or life, for smuggling (limited to 1 year under the 2004 Law). In 
addition to their overall vagueness and potential for mutual contradiction, Libyan laws 
are manifestly lacking in terms of administrative or judicial remedies. Besides, they do 
not condemn trafficking or provide for the protection of victims. Lastly, while there is 
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no explicit provision for administrative detention, the practice of detaining migrants 
(independently of any conviction for illegal immigration) has increased considerably 
along with Qaddafi’s commitment to containing migrants (Morone 2016).22 The law still 
appears as a matter of show and a ‘megaphone’ for intention rather than a framework. 
It backs arrest, detention, and expulsion without guaranteeing any rights.
On the other hand, the operational dimension of combating illegal migration has been 
developed through the creation of institutions dedicated to it. As an example, Decree 
No. 386 of 2014, adopted during the interim government, created the Anti-Illegal 
Migration Agency (AIMA), under the Ministry of the Interior. This agency coordinates 
and supervises actions against illegal migration carried out by the branches and 
offices affiliated with it; its job includes apprehending “illegal migrants in Libya” and 
“placing them in shelters” prior to their deportation.23 As we will see, the placement 
of migrants in (holding/transit/reception) camps has become central to the national 
and international system of migration management that is developing in Libya. The 
EU’s pressure on Libya to control its borders and contain migrants has never eased, 
even during and after the war. The EU and its member states’ strategy since 2011 has 
consisted in restoring Libya’s effective control over its territorial sea, but also beyond, 
in order to circumvent the limits of European and international law. 
Whereas Qaddafi was an unpredictable partner, reluctant to integrate Euro-
Mediterranean mechanisms, he undertook close cooperation with Libya’s historical 
partner, Italy. In 2003–2004, the two countries organised joint flights to bring back 
to Libya the thousands of migrants who had left its shores – collective expulsions 
for which Italy has never been condemned. The collaboration intensified after the 
conclusion of a friendship agreement in 2008 and, the following year, joint patrols 
started in the Mediterranean, going as far as setting up Italy’s push-back practice: 
migrants intercepted by Italians at sea were directly entrusted to Libyan ships who 
brought them back to Libya, without any guarantee for their future. Italy was finally 
condemned in February 2012 by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in the 
now famous Hirsi Jamaa judgment.24 The judgment contains important statements that 
have conditioned the evolution of practices and policies in the Mediterranean, among 
them: Libya cannot be considered a safe third country to which people can be pushed 
back or deported; European countries are responsible for the fate of migrants they once 
had in their charge, even at sea: they cannot divest themselves of their human rights 
obligations, even on the basis of a bilateral agreement. 
At the time of this judgment, practices, policies, and law seemed to be shifting, yet 
pulled by opposing forces. The National Transitional Council (NTC), which was set up 
at the beginning of the war in Libya in February 2011, wanted to reassure Europe and 
enter the “concert of nations”, both in terms of combatting irregular migration and 
respecting human rights. Composed largely of jurists and former activists, the NTC 
sought to advance a human rights agenda (Eyster, Paoletti 2016: 145). While it entered 
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into a widely criticised Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Italy, in which it 
made a commitment to working against unauthorised departures from Libyan coasts 
and facilitating returns,25 it also promised to develop a migration policy as well as ratify 
the Geneva Convention on the Status of Refugees, something Qaddafi always refused 
to do. It recognised the right to asylum in the 2011 Constitutional Declaration and 
enabled the UNHCR to return to the country. It also created the DCIM (Department for 
Combatting Illegal Migration), which seeks to regain control over detention centres, 
and adopted Law No. 10 of 2013, criminalising torture, forced disappearances, and 
discrimination. 
In parallel, the new but ephemeral President of the Italian Council, Enrico Letta, launched 
in October 2013 the Mare Nostrum operation to rescue migrants at sea. Nevertheless, 
while the NTC gave way in August 2013 to the National Congress elected by the Libyans 
as political chaos spread, Italy was not able to obtain the support of Europe for its 
rescue operation, considered a pull factor for migrants, and so ended it. Mare Nostrum 
was replaced in November 2014 by Frontex’s Operation Triton, which significantly 
reduced the area of intervention and was less about rescuing migrants than it was 
about combatting smuggling. In the same period, in Libya, deepening clashes among 
a myriad of non-state armed groups paralysed already weak state institutions, and 
insecurity and instability made governance hazardous.
In fact, since 2011, Italy and the other EU member states have continued to pursue 
the restoration of Libya’s capacity to act as a border guard, but the Hirsi judgment 
has led to a rethinking of this strategy. EU Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM) Libya, 
launched in 2013, aimed to generate an “integrated border management” strategy like 
that already in place in the EU’s neighbourhood, i.e., to enhance Libya’s capacity to 
control its borders. In parallel to the failure of this mission,26 which also had to be 
relocated in Tunisia in 2014, various partnerships and mechanisms have been put in 
place or suggested by Italy and the EU, but also IOM and the UNHCR, all of them 
focused on enhancing Libya’s capacity to manage migration and borders, supposedly 
while respecting human rights and international law. In reality, the tendency is to try 
to strengthen this capacity while at the same time supplanting Libyan actors deemed 
incapable. This justified the EU’s attempt, in 2015, to set up a military operation 
(European Union Naval Force in the South Central Mediterranean - EUNAVFOR Med), 
inspired by the anti-piracy naval operation off Somalia, that would act directly on 
Libyan territory to destroy smugglers’ boats and “disrupt the business model of human 
smuggling and trafficking networks in the Southern Central Mediterranean”.27 Faced 
with the refusal of the Libyan authorities of the time and of the UN Security Council to 
authorise such an action, EUNAVFOR Med limited its military Operation Sophia to the 
high seas and extended its scope to capacity building and training of the Libyan Coast 
Guard and Navy. This is something it has carried out in coordination with Frontex to 
provide the Libyan Coast Guard and Navy with various types of training. The Seahorse 
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Mediterranean Network as well has offered training (aiming at information exchange), 
in preparation for Libya’s incorporation into the European border surveillance system 
(EUROSUR). 
Libya has also received various financial and material support in recent years, including 
through the 2015 Emergency Trust Fund (ETF) for Africa to enhance its capacity to 
control its borders, intercept migrants, and ultimately become solely responsible for 
search and rescue (SAR) in the Libyan area. Libya, as well as Egypt and Tunisia, has 
indeed been urged by the EU to declare its SAR zones and create maritime rescue 
coordination centres (MRCCs). This should enable a progressive disengagement of the 
EU and its member states from SAR operations on the high seas that would allow them 
to divest themselves of their jurisdiction over migrants as per the terms of the ECtHR 
Hirsi judgment. Despite the human and humanitarian consequences on migrants, it 
would also avoid the possibility of being saved at sea and brought to European shores – 
considered a pull factor for migrants. The restrictive code of conduct for NGOs engaged 
in SAR operations, issued by the Italian authorities in 2017, is part of the policy of 
deterring migrants from undertaking the trip to Europe,28 along with the signing, 
in February 2017, of a Memorandum of Understanding which aims at boosting and 
extending cooperation between Italy and Libya in combatting irregular migration. 
Up until then, Libya had sovereignty over its territorial seas (12 nautical miles). 
Between these territorial seas and the limit of 24 nautical miles (the contiguous zone 
where the state can enforce its laws, particularly with regard to migration, but without 
exercising sovereignty), it had not exercised its prerogatives. SAR operations were 
generally coordinated by the Italian Coast Guard, something that still represented a 
legal risk for Italy.29 Hence the importance of clearing Europe of any liability and of 
transferring this responsibility to the Libyan Coast Guards within their SAR area. Libya 
eventually notified the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) of the creation of a 
SAR and a national MRCC in summer 2018. Since then, the Libyan MRCC has received 
distress calls and been empowered to coordinate rescues. Incidents have consequently 
multiplied (distress signals left unanswered by the MRCC, conflicts between the Libyan 
Coast Guard and NGOs at sea, etc.) and contributed to excluding NGOs from search and 
rescue – together with European states’ tactics to prevent NGOs from sailing.
The official government’s lack of authority over the security forces, border guards, 
and militias, as well as the latter being involved in the smuggling economy, are well-
known,30 as is the continued violation of migrants’ rights at sea and on land. The 
profusion of capacity-building activities and mechanisms serves both as a lure and tool 
of legitimation. The Libyan government of Fayez al-Sarraj is legitimised by agreements 
and cooperation, and reinforced both internationally and internally by the ‘trust’ granted 
to Libya to assume rescues and control in its SAR. Capacity building also legitimises 
Italy’s and the EU’s support to Libyan stakeholders in fighting migration, including when 
it is likely to fuel migrants’ detention and mistreatment. While arbitrary and inhumane 
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detention conditions are constantly denounced, the MoU of February 2017 encouraged 
Libya to host migrants in EU- and Italy-funded camps while Italy agreed to provision 
and train the staff working in these centres.31 Whatever the reality of the Libyan field, 
Italy and the EU adapt their strategy to pursue a migrant containment policy, which the 
fragmented context has provided new opportunities for. In parallel to enhancing Libya’s 
capacity to counter migration in the Mediterranean, new mechanisms aim to supplant 
its incapacity upstream and around its territory.
b) Managing migrants’ containment, selection, and distribution upstream: The role of 
international organisations in platforming32 the new European border in the Sahel
As early as 2005, when the EU started an ad hoc dialogue with Libya on migration, 
the project to secure the ‘Central Mediterranean route’ upstream, in the Sahara and 
beyond, was already on the agenda. From 2006, the EU was calling for strengthening the 
Libya-Niger border and the inclusion of IOM to assist ‘voluntary returns’ (Enhancement 
of Transit and Irregular Migration Management in Libya programme). The project to 
develop transit camps in Libya to organise returns, however, was controversial within 
the EU itself. Qaddafi was also reluctant to accept international agencies on Libya’s 
territory. Furthermore, expulsions of migrants remained a diplomatic instrument that 
he did not wish to rationalise.
However, from 2008, Qaddafi embarked on agreements with states along its southern 
border (Niger, Chad, Sudan), as well as within the CENSAD, aimed at countering irregular 
migration and facilitating repatriations. These agreements, which broke with bilateral 
and regional commitments in favour of mobility in the region, have been little followed 
in practice and were subject to diplomatic and geopolitical considerations. In addition, 
negotiations between the EU and Qaddafi were still harsh, and the 2010 agenda for 
Libya’s cooperation with the EU stumbled over the Libyan leader’s financial claims for 
the cost of its cooperation in border control (Perrin 2011: 297).
In the meantime, however, IOM, present in Niger and Libya since 2006, built its first 
transit centre in 2009 in Dirkou, northern Niger, where it received migrants expelled 
from Libya by the Libyan authorities and organised their repatriation (Brachet 2016: 
279). The EU was also intensifying programmes in the region, such as the 2010 “Sahara–
MED: Prevention and Management of Irregular Migration Flows from Sahara Desert to 
Mediterranean Sea”.
Qaddafi’s downfall and the situation that has prevailed since then have radically 
changed the context in which “migration management” (Geiger, Pecoud 2010) can be 
implemented. As Brachet perfectly poses it, “[t]hrough the replacement of local politics 
by international crisis management, the Sahara is gradually integrated into a zone of 
international bureaucratic expedience” (Brachet 2016: 287). 
Two turning points have enabled the de-politicisation of the protection, selection, 
and distribution of migrants in a large deterritorialised area: the flight of hundreds 
89
Libya in transition: human mobility, international conflict and state building
of thousands people during the war in 2011, which strengthened and consolidated 
the role of IOM in repatriating migrants (humanitarian evacuations) and presented 
an opportunity for the UNHCR to expand the ‘protection space’; and more recently, 
in November 2017, the video of CNN showing a sale of migrants, which led to the 
organisation of a system of evacuation, selection, and distribution involving IOM and 
the UNHCR on a platform coupling Libya and Niger. 
The UNHCR, which has been tolerated in Libya since 1991, has struggled hard to gain 
access to detention centres and identify potential refugees there. In 2004, it was in 
charge of 12,000 people in need of protection, and relations with the Libyan authorities 
were about to warm after difficult times. In April 2009, a plan for developing a national 
asylum system was launched, and the UNHCR obtained permission to open offices 
in Libya. The refugee agency subsequently was granted the right to visit 15 migrant 
detention centres across the country to identify possible refugees where many other 
organisations had been denied access. However, after it was expelled from Libya in 
2010, it had to back off.
Even if the situation has changed little in legal terms, the UNHCR has been able to 
intensify its action since 2011. In April 2011, a protection cluster was established for 
Libya, while a Regional Protection Programme (RPP) was launched, funded by the EU 
and implemented by the UNHCR, with the aim of developing protection capacity in 
Libya and Tunisia. Between 2011 and 2013, the UNHCR engaged in training coast 
guards and detention authorities. If no MoU was concluded, the UNHCR has been able 
to give assistance to persons in detention and to conduct refugee status determination 
since then. Together with IOM and NGOs like Human Rights Watch, it is allowed to visit 
the migrant detention centres run by the DCIM.
The same partners also have access to disembarkation points where migrants intercepted 
at sea by the Libyan Coast Guard are landed. The UNHCR covers the 12 points in terms 
of protection monitoring and shares them with IOM in terms of humanitarian and 
medical assistance. All the people intercepted and disembarked are routinely placed in 
detention. The UNHCR advocates for the release of individuals and registers refugees 
for the purpose of humanitarian evacuations.33 
The emergency evacuation plan through a “joint task force”, announced by the African 
Union (AU), the EU, and the United Nations in November 2017,34 has enabled these 
missions to be intensified and systematised. The chairman of the AU Commission 
stressed that “between 400,000 and 700,000 African migrants were living in camps in 
Libya, often under inhuman conditions”.35 Libya has suddenly been presented as a large 
“camp” where migrants would all be “stranded” on their way to Europe. As a first step 
in the emergency voluntary humanitarian return (VHR) operation, IOM organised the 
repatriation of 3,100 Ivorians, bringing the number of migrants assisted by IOM to go 
home in 2017 to 16,561, compared to 2,700 in 2016.
In November 2017, the UNHCR welcomed the decision of the Libyan authorities to set up 
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a “gathering and departure facility” (open in December 2018) in Tripoli through which 
“people in need of protection” would be “transferred”,36 either through evacuation to 
UNHCR-run emergency facilities in other countries or through return or resettlement. 
Most evacuations and resettlements are organised towards and from Niger. Out of 
the 2,793 individuals evacuated out of Libya, 2,202 have been sent to its Emergency 
Evacuation Transit Mechanism in Niger, created at the end of 2017. The UNHCR regularly 
calls upon countries to offer refugee resettlement places. While it tries to associate 
refugees’ protection needs to border protection, it struggles to get pledges. In 2016, 
“resettlement opportunities were offered to only 6% of the refugees in need in the 15 
priority countries of asylum and transit along the Central Mediterranean route”.37 In 
September 2017, the UNHCR asked for 40,000 additional resettlement places along the 
same route; it has received approximately 13,000 offers for 2018 and 2019.38 Refugee 
resettlement, which involves only a small part of refugees worldwide,39 is advocated 
by the UNHCR and the EU as a way to provide protected entry procedures for refugees 
as well as selection opportunities for states. Yet, not only are states reluctant to offer 
resettlement places, they don’t always resettle as they pledged.
The question of the protection of migrants is closely linked to that of their selection 
and distribution because protection justifies and legitimises the latter – while at 
the same time selection also generates the need for protection. It is with the aim 
of protecting migrants that IOM and the UNHCR have gained access to detention 
centres and landing points for migrants. Protection is also a means of counteracting 
intentions of passage to Europe and even to Libya. While the reduction in legal modes 
of mobility has increased migrants resorting to irregularity and criminal networks, 
thus aggravating their vulnerability, the protection mantra justifies further containing 
mobility upstream from the Mediterranean, but also upstream from Libya and parts 
of Niger that are increasingly considered no-cross zones. The search for protection is 
the criterion on which is based the distinction between refugees and other migrants 
considered to have left their country for other reasons. It therefore forms the basis for 
the distribution of roles between the UNHCR, competent for the former, and IOM for the 
latter. Nevertheless, the distinction has recently gotten blurred, both by mistreatments 
in Libya that can turn ‘migrants’ into ‘people in need of protection’ to be evacuated 
by UNHCR and by the agenda to curb irregular migration and therefore orientate the 
selection of refugees to be resettled in Europe.40 
In addition to the ‘guesthouses’ the UNHCR has to operate in Niger, IOM now manages 
six centres (in Dirkou, Niamey, Agadez, and Arlit) where migrants evacuated or expelled 
from Libya or Algeria, or who arrived in Niger from various places, are assisted and 
encouraged to return to their home country. IOM has also developed ‘information 
campaigns’ to deter migrants from heading to Libya, also using ‘community mobilisers’ 
trained to reach out to migrants in various parts of Niger and convince them to go to 
transit centres and organise their return. 
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Coupled with Libya, the Nigerien territory has turned into a ‘platform’ for managing the 
new European border in the Sahel. Since Qaddafi’s downfall, and especially since 2014 
and the intensification of chaos in Libya, Niger has become the new target of the EU’s 
pressure to stop migrants upstream. As the main beneficiary of the ETF, it is now ‘the 
place to be’ for a myriad of national and international external stakeholders developing 
projects and opportunities dedicated to migration management on the route to Libya. 
Niger has indeed been affected by the Libyan crisis, in terms of insecurity but also 
migration routes and the economy around it. While an Order criminalising the trafficking 
of persons was adopted in 2010 with little impact, Law No. 36 of 2015 against migrant 
smuggling emerged in a completely different context. In the meantime, the EU’s external 
border has moved from Libya south into Niger (Boyer, Chappart: 2018), bringing with 
it a series of border security forces (EUCAP Sahel, French-Spanish joint investigative 
team, Frontex liaison officer, among others). The implementation of Nigerien Law No. 
36 in 2016, which led to the arrests of hundreds of drivers and the confiscation of 
numerous cars, also resulted in changes in migration routes and networks to Libya, 
becoming more discreet and dangerous. The same year, IOM observed a significant 
increase in numbers of people arriving at its centres and slated to be repatriated.
Conclusions
This new situation of Niger and its articulation with Libya is interesting in various 
regards, four of which I highlight here. First, there is a growing trend in recipient 
countries of migrants to require the states upstream of their borders to retain people in 
their territory or readmit them (Spain/Morocco, United Kingdom/France, etc). Strikingly, 
Libya is replaced by a set of European and international actors in the requirement 
that Niger contains and readmits migrants. Suspected of taking the first step on the 
‘Central Mediterranean route’, Nigeriens and other nationals of ECOWAS (the Economic 
Community of West African States) countries deemed free to move in Niger must be 
kept from going north, whether they leave Agadez or Zinder.41 Second, both Libya and 
Niger are also disempowered in the implementation of containment, readmission, 
and protection: the selection of people in Libya to be evacuated to Niger and their 
distribution, as well as the organisation of repatriation and resettlement from Libya 
and Niger, are carried out by IOM and UNHCR. While Niger had agreed on this platform 
on the condition that the management would be fluid and would guarantee short stays 
before return or resettlement, resettlement pledges remain very low and the foreign 
presence has been greater and longer. Third, this ‘platforming’ of the European border 
in the Sahel is part of a dynamic of ‘encampment’ (Agier 2011) and experimentation 
with new forms of extraterritorial migration management that henceforth accompany 
the outsourcing of EU migration policies. Fourth, a humanitarian discourse masks these 
developments and hides the complexity of migrants’ profiles, routes, and ambitions. 
Their overall victimisation, fueled by confusion in discourses and mechanisms as well 
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as on the ground, between smuggling and trafficking, justifies the decisions taken on 
their destinies. 
It is likewise through a narrative of victimisation that the Libyans have come to view 
migration on their territory, considering it – as it has been suggested to them – a 
step for migrants heading for Europe. The resulting depoliticization of migration in 
Libya reduces migrants and the mechanisms put in place to refrain their mobility to a 
bargaining tool.
Delphine Perrin is a researcher at IRD (Institut de Recherche pour le Développement), 
Aix-Marseille University, LPED (Laboratoire Population Environnement Développement).
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French President Macron sent to the Office Français Pour les Réfugiés et Apatrides (OFPRA) for its selection 
missions to Niger and Chad in 2017 for resettlement in France.  
41 - See field report, D. Perrin, Niger: Quelles relations entre dynamiques d’acteurs et dynamiques juridiques 
et politiques concernant les migrations?, “Atelier Movida”, 16 February 2018: https://movida.hypotheses.
org/2032.
References
Agier M. (2011), L’encampement du monde, in «Plein Droit», vol. 3, n. 90
Bensaâd A. (2012), L’immigration en Libye : une ressource et la diversité de ses usages, in «Politique africaine», 
vol. 125, n. 1
Boyer F., P. Chappart (2018), Les frontières européennes au Niger, in «Vacarme» vol. 2, n. 83
Brachet J. (2016), Policing the Desert: The IOM in Libya Beyond War and Peace, in «Antipodes», vol. 48, n. 2
Bullich V. (2018), La ‘plateformisation’ de la formation, in «Distances et médiations des savoirs», n. 21, Mars
Day A. J. (2004), “Libya”, in Regional Surveys of the World, vol. 50, The Middle East and North Africa, 
Routledge, London
Eyster E., E. Paoletti (2016), “Expanding protection space in Libya and Tunisia after the Arab Spring”, in S. 
Trevisanut, F. Ippolito (eds.), Migration in the Mediterranean, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Geiger M., A. Pécoud (2010), The Politics of International Migration Management, Palgrave McMillan, 
Basingstoke
Haddad S. (2005), Les migrations africaines, enjeu géopolitique libyen, in «Maghreb Machrek», vol. 185, pp. 
81-94 
Morone A. (2016), “Crise de l’Etat et politiques migratoires dans la Libye post-Kadhafi”, in A. Bozzo, P.J. 
Luizard (eds.), Vers un nouveau Moyen-Orient? États arabes en crise entre logiques de division et sociétés 
civiles, TrE-Press, Roma
Perrin D. (2009), Les migrations en Libye, un instrument de la diplomatie khadafienne, in «Outre-Terre», n. 
23, pp. 289-304
Perrin D. (2011), Fin de régime et migrations en Libye – Les enseignements juridiques d’un pays en feu, 
«L’Année du Maghreb», vol. 7, pp. 285-301
Perrin D. (2016), “Regulating Migration and Asylum in the Maghreb: Which Inspiration for an Accelerated 
Legal Development?”, in S. Trevisanut, F. Ippolito (eds.), Migration in the Mediterranean, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, pp. 192-214
Pliez O. (2004), “De l’immigration au transit ? La Libye dans l’espace migratoire euro-africain”, in O. Pliez 
(ed.), La nouvelle Libye – sociétés, espace et géopolitique au lendemain de l’embargo, Karthala-Iremam, 
Paris
€ 13,00
ISSN 1592-6753
Numeri pubblicati
1/99 Esilî e memoria
2/99 I conflitti in Africa
3/99 La transizione in Sudafrica
4/99 Elezioni e transizioni politiche in Africa
1/00 Comunicazione, immagini, linguaggi
2/00 Processi di pace e conflitti in Sudan
3-4/00 Emigrare, immigrare, transmigrare
1/01 Informalità, illegalità e politiche pubbliche in Africa
2/01 Cultura popolare, sviluppo e democrazia
3-4/01 Sguardi antropologici sul turismo
1/02 La crisi in Afghanistan e Asia centrale
2/02 Migrazioni e xenofobia in Africa australe
3/02 Quale politica dell’Italia in Africa e nel Mediterraneo?
4/02 Idee di islam
Speciale 2003 USA-Iraq le ragioni di un conflitto
1/03 Culture coloniali e letterature dell’Africa sub-ahariana
2/03 La crisi in Zimbabwe
3-4/03 Economia e politiche dell’acqua
Speciale 2004 Voci di donne nel cinema dell’Africa
              e del Mediterraneo
1-2/04 Conflitto e transizione in Congo
3/04 Movimenti e conflitti sociali in Africa
4/2004 - 1/2005 Scritture dei conflitti
2/05 Ambiente e sviluppo sostenibile in Africa australe
3/05 Migranti africani in Italia: etnografie
4/05 Parole parlate. Comunicazione orale fra tradizione
              e modernità
Speciale I 2006 Stato-nazione e movimenti nazionalisti 
              nell’Africa australe post-coloniale
Speciale II 2006 Occidente e Africa. Democrazia e    
              nazionalismo dalla prima alla seconda transizione
1-2/06 Sudan 1956-2006: cinquant’anni di indipendenza
3-4/06 Trasformazioni democratiche in Africa
1/07 Il ritorno della memoria coloniale
Speciale 2007 Terra e risorse naturali in Africa. Quali diritti?
2/07 Narrative di migrazione, diaspore ed esili
3-4/07 Fondamentalismi nell’Africa del XXI secolo
1/08 Mondo arabo. Cittadini e welfare sociale
Speciale I 2008 Africa australe. Comunità rurali, sistemi di 
autorità e politiche di decentramento
Speciale II 2008 Decentralising Power and Resource Control in 
sub-Saharan Africa
2/08     La Cina in Africa
3-4/08  Donne e diritti sociali in Africa
Speciale I 2009 AIDS, povertà e democrazia in Africa
1-2/09 Africa in Europa: strategie e forme associative
Speciale II 2009 La povertà in Africa sub-sahariana: approcci e 
 politiche
3-4/09  La schiavitù dalle colonie degli imperi alle trasmigrazioni 
postcoloniali
1/10 Il calcio in Sudafrica: identità, politica ed economia
Speciale 2010 Controllare la natura.
             Politiche di tutela ambientale in Africa  sub-sahariana
2/10 Transnazionalismo dei saperi e ONG islamiche
             nell’Africa occidentale
3-4/10 La crisi afghana e il contesto regionale
1-2/11 Unione Europea e Africa
Speciale I 2011 Sviluppo rurale e riduzione della povertà in Etiopia
3-4/11 Cittadinanza e politiche dell'appartenenza in Africa 
 sub-sahariana
Speciale II 2011 L’Africa sub-sahariana negli anni ‘70
1-2/12  Percorsi della democrazia in Africa
Speciale AIDS 2012 HIV/AIDS e comunità rurali in Africa australe: 
sudditi o cittadini?
3-4/12  Giovani in Africa. Prospettive antropologiche
1-2/13  Linee di conflitto: il mondo arabo in trasformazione
3-4/13  Fronti della guerra fredda in Africa sub-sahariana
1-2/14  Partiti islamisti e relazioni internazionali in Nord Africa 
 e Medio Oriente
3/14      Il Rwanda a vent’anni dal genocidio
Speciale 2014 La questione della terra in Mozambico fra diritti 
              delle comunità e investimenti
Speciale 2015 Rural Development and Poverty Reduction in
              Southern Africa: Experiences from Zambia and Malawi
1-2/15  Stato e società in Egitto e Tunisia: involuzioni ed evoluzioni
3/15      The New Harvest. Agrarian Policies and Rural 
 Transformation in Southern Africa
1/16 I movimenti delle donne in Nord Africa e Medio Oriente: 
percorsi e generazioni "femministe" a confronto
2-3/16 Le pratiche dello Stato in Africa: spazi sociali e politici 
contestati
1/17 Storie dell’Africa e fonti nell’era della “rivoluzione digitale”
2/17 Frontiere, confini e zone di frontiera nella regione MENA
3/17 International Solidarities and the Liberation of the 
Portuguese Colonies
1-2/18 L'Africa tra vecchie e nuove potenze
ISBN: 978-88-6086-165-8
9 7 8 8 8 6 0 8 6 1 6 5 8
